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COMMENTS AND RESEARCH REPORTS

ing of shoplifting are shared with other authors.
Some thefts are in response to an acute neurotic
or realistic need to act as a providing father or
mother. "Sometimes the description of an act or a
theft gives the impression that it is a substitute act
of sexual character." 5 Faure and Rappard speak of
"le raptus vol" in petit larceny." Faure and Rappard also include interesting reflections on the
Potlach implicit in some "Vols M6lancholiques."
The Clinic has not seen this aspect of larceny, but
has been aware of several Samson-like "bring the
temple down on myself and everyone else" fantasies. Bowlby's "Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves"'
are of interest in that of his four who have had
"severe and well-defined depressions," one has just
lost a mother to death, and two their mothers to
serious illness, while the fourth- had been doublepromoted at school out of her original clais. The
author attributes her depression to difficulty in
excelling in the higher grade. Like Laignel-Lavastine's Maurice,8 the Clinic shoplifters are sometimes "deplorably brought up," but many are
actually competent, capable individuals who are
in crisis and who are by no means universally from
5 Christiansen, Theft With a Typical Motive, 21 ACTA
PSYcHIATRICA ET NEUROLOGICA 195 (1946).
6 Faure & Rappard, Vol e Melancolie: De la Perle a
la recuperation de P'object, CARTERs PsYcniAnzIQuEs 96
(Supp. 11 to Strasbourg Med. 1956).
7Bowlby, Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves: Their Characters and Home Life, 25 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 19,
1078 (1944).
Laignel-Lavastine, Du Crime au Crimind, 72
ARcHIvEs

INTERNATIONALES

DE

NEVROLOGIE

110

(Paris 1953).

broken homes. They display talents and strengths
that have led to the thought that their low repeat
rate may be due to a greater personality strength
than the average Municipal Court misdemeanant's.
The crime may be a symptom of an acute emotional crisis which is then limited by the misdemeanant's strength as well as by the impact of
court and clinic.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In summary the following conclusions are possible:
(1) The convicted Cincinnati shoplifter seems
less likely to repeat the misdemeanor than the
other types of court misdemeanants.
(2) The shoplifter who is convicted but arouses
the judge's interest sufficiently for a referral to
the Municipal Court Psychiatric Clinic and thence
to subsequent agencies seems even less likely to
repeat the misdemeanor than the unreferred
convicted shoplifter.
(3) The shoplifter evidently suffers from depression significantly more than other misdemeanants.
(4) A theft may be a way of coping with a
critical personal loss.
(5) The theft may also be a means of seeking
attention, revenge, sexual gratification, and carrying out hostile impulses.
(6) The shoplifter's relative personality strength
and passage through a nice balance of punishment
and restitution may be important factors in the
low rate of recidivism.
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Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor
Attorney-Client Privilege-United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). Defendant,
an accountant, was convicted of criminal contempt
for refusal to answer questions before a grand
jury. On appeal, defendant contended that since
he was acting as agent for an attorney when he
gained the information in issue from the attorney's client, the attorney-client privilege
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.

extended to the communications, and hence defendant should not have been held in contempt
for failure to disclose them. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit vacated judgment and
remanded for further hearing, holding that the
attorney-client privilege extends to communications made by a client to an accountant hired by
an attorney, if such communications are made
incident to the client's obtaining of legal advice
from the attorney; and since absence of evidence
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relating to the circumstances under which the
client's communications reached defendant was
attributable to the trial judge's fixed view against
defendant's claim of privilege and to uncertainty
at the trial as to the applicable legal principle,
the cause must be remanded for determination of
those circumstances.

Bigamy--People v. Dunn, 19 Cal. Rptr. 835
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
bigamy [CAL. PEN. CODE §2811. On appeal,
defendant contended that California lacked jurisdiction to punish him for a bigamous marriage
solemnized outside the state. The District Court
of Appeal affirmed, holding that the statute, as
applied to defendant, punished not the foreign
offense of solemnization but rather the flaunting
of California's sovereignty by cohabitation, an
essential requisite of marriage, within its territorial jurisdiction, after celebration of the bigamous marriage outside the state; and that such
cohabitation constituted the offense of bigamy
even where the first marriage as well as the second
was solemnized outside California.

Coerced Plea of Guilty-Rogers v. State, 136 So.
2d 331 (Miss. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
murder. On appeal from the Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis,
defendant contended that his plea of guilty was
induced by the trial judge, and hence that it was
involuntary and not binding on defendant. Sustaining the petition for writ of error coram nobis,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and
remanded, holding that in making promises of
lenient treatment, the trial judge actively participated in persuading defendant to plead guilty
to the extent that the plea was not voluntarily
made and consequently was not binding on
defendant. The court noted that while the judge
did not act corruptly or from any bad motive, his
actions were indiscreet and at variance with
traditional standards of judicial decorum.

Confessions-People v. Nemke, 179 N.E.2d 825
(Ill. 1962). Defendant, aged 17, was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. On writ of error,
defendant contended that the trial court erred
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in overruling his motion to suppress alleged confessions and in admitting them into evidence.
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded, holding that when the trial judge restricted defense counsel in his interrogation of
defendant as to why he had confessed, refused to
permit defendant's mother to testify as to her
telephone conversations with a police officer, and
failed to require the state to produce or explain
the absence of material witnesses to the voluntariness of defendant's confessions, the judge thereby
unduly restricted the scope of the preliminary
hearing and thus did not have before him all the
relevant circumstances necessary to making an
adequate judgment with regard to the competency [voluntariness] of the confessions.

Confessions-State v. Fauntleroy, 177 A.2d 762
(N.J. 1962). Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder. On appeal, defendant contended
that coerced confessions had been received in
evidence. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed and remanded, holding that where the
trial court's ruling that defendant's confessions
were admissible was based on finding only that
there had been no misrepresentation or physical
brutality, the standard of admissibility used was
erroneous, since it disregarded the concept that a
man's will may be overborne by means other than
misrepresentation or physical violence; and that
defendant's conviction must therefore be set
aside for failure of the trial court to apply a constitutionally proper standard in determining
admissibility of the confessions.

Confessions-Collins v. State, 352 S.W.2d 841
(Tex. Crim. App. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of murder. On appeal, defendant contended that
the confession used against him was inadmissible
as a matter of law, having been obtained in violation of due process. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed, holding that where no
promises were made to defendant, no physical
violence was inflicted or threatened, and defendant was not denied the right of consultation
with his family or attorney, was not questioned
for an unreasonable length of time, was not
mentally defective, and had a twelfth grade education, defendant failed to prove that the confession had been obtained in violation of state and
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federal due process even though, before confessing,
he was arrested without a warrant, was not taken
forthwith before a magistrate, was incarcerated
in an out-of-town jail under an assumed name, and
was given a lie detector test.

Demeanor Evidence-McBride v. State, 368
P.2d 925 (Alaska 1962). See Right to Confrontation, infra.

Habitual Criminal Acts-Oyler v. Boles, 82 Sup.
Ct. 501 (1962). Petitioners were sentenced to life
imprisonment under West Virginia's habitual
criminal statute [W. VA. CODE ANN. §6130 (1961)],
and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia denied their separate petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. On certiorari, petitioners contended that the statute had been applied without
advance notice and to only a minority of those
subject to its provisions, in violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Speaking through Mr. Justice
Clark, the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that since petitioners had assistance of
counsel and conceded the applicability of the
statute to their cases, their right to due process
was not violated by failure to notify them of the
habitual criminal charges until after conviction of
the substantive offense; and that absent evidence
that selective enforcement of the statute was
deliberately based on an unjustified standard
[i.e., race or religion], the mere fact that penitentiary records indicated that a high percentage
of those subject to the statute had not been proceeded against thereunder failed to establish
denial to petitioners of equal protection of the
laws. Mr. Justice Harlan joined in the Court's
opinion and also filed a separate opinion comparing the instant case and Chewning v. Cunningham,
82 Sup. Ct. 498 (1962) [See Right to Counsel,
infra]. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr.
Chief Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Black, and
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred, dissented on the
ground that petitioners had not been afforded
adequate notice of the recidivist charges as required by the procedural aspect of due process.

Habitual Criminal Acts-Smith v. State, 181
N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1962). Defendant was con-

victed of forgery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. On appeal
from the trial court's overruling of his motion for
new trial, defendant contended that the state had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
had been convicted of two prior felonies, and
therefore the evidence did not support the verdict
finding that defendant was an habitual criminal.
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed with
instructions to grant defendant's motion for new
trial, holding that the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt extends to the alleged former
convictions relied on in a prosecution under the
Habitual Criminal Act [Iin. ANN. STAT. §9-2208
(1956)]; that evidence consisting of properly
certified copies of two judgments of conviction
and two sets of commitment papers bearing the
same or similar name as defendant's, without any
other evidence to identify defendant as the person
named in the judgments and commitment papers,
was insufficient to establish the alleged prior
felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt;
and since proof of two such convictions is an
essential element of the offense of being an habitual criminal, defendant's conviction must be
reversed.

Insanity-Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp.
569 (D.D.C. 1961). Petitioner was found not
guilty of intoxication by reason of insanity and
was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital. On
petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that when the trial court refused to accept
her plea of guilty and instead committed her as
criminally insane on finding her not guilty on the
ground of insanity, her right to due process of law
was violated. The District Court sustained the
writ and ordered that petitioner be released,
holding that because a District of Columbia
statute makes mandatory the commitment to St.
Elizabeths Hospital of one acquitted by reason of
insanity, the trial court's action constituted a
violation of due process where petitioner had not
advanced a plea of insanity.

Insanity-Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997 (Alaska
1962). Defendant was convicted of second degree
murder. On appeal, he contended that the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as to
his insanity defense, in terms of the Durham ruel
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[see Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954)] and of the "irresistible impulse"
test; but that even if it correctly chose to give a
M'Naghten instruction [see M'Naghten's Case, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)], the trial court erred
by failing to require the state to prove insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt and by incorrectly
stating the M'Naghten rules. Noting that the
present state of development in the science of
psychiatry did not provide a persuasive basis for
a change in the existing law, the Supreme Court of
Alaska affirmed, holding that in light of the invariably great technicality and complexity of
evidence concerning responsibility and in lack of
a scientifically precise definition of responsibility,
the M'Naghten rules would be retained as the
criteria of criminal responsibility in Alaska, since
these rules provide the jury with clearer and
simpler principles upon which to base their
decision as to criminal accountability than do any
of the other tests; that since sanity is a quality of
one who commits a crime rather than an element
of the crime itself, the state was not required to
prove defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, but rather defendant must overcome the
very strong presumption of sanity by proving
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence; and
that use in the instruction of conjunctive rather
than disjunctive wording ("... incapable of
knowing the nature and quality of his act and of
distinguishing between right and wrong... ")
was not erroneous even though the M'Naghten
rules are phrased in the disjunctive, inasmuch as
to hold otherwise would necessitate the illogical
inference, unsupported by scientific principles,
that the intellect is divisible into two distinct
parts. Justice Arend dissented from the majority's
approval of the conjunctive phraseology.

Insanity-People v. Roth, 181 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y.
1962). Defendant was convicted of murder. On
appeal, he contended that receipt in evidence of a
report concerning his ability to stand trial, prepared by two psychiatrists pursuant to direction
of the trial court, constituted reversible error. The
Court of Appeals of New York reversed and
ordered a new trial, holding that unless the report
had been offered by defendant, its admission would
constitute reversible error, for the reasons that a
statute [N.Y. CODE CIM. PROC. §622] prohibits
the admission of such reports, that such reports
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invariably contain admissions by a defendant,
and that the standard used in determining whether
a defendant is capable of standing trial is substantively different from that used in determining
whether he is legally accountable for his acts;
that since it was not connected with Bellevue
Hospital records which had been offered by defendant, the report was not offered by him even
though it was physically incorporated with the
hospital records; and that consequently receipt
of the report constituted reversible error.

Lie Detector Evidence-State v. Anderson, 113
N.W.2d 4 (Minn. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of third degree burglary. On appeal from denial
of his motion for new trial, defendant contended
that the trial court's refusal to permit his counsel
to comment on his willingness to submit to a lie
detector test constituted reversible error. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed, holding
that comments on either refusal or willingness to
take lie detector tests are improper, since results
of such tests are inadmissible as evidence.

Obscenity-People v. Marler, 18 Cal. Rptr. 923
(Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1962). Defendant was
convicted of giving obscene films in violation of a
city ordinance. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
that if the films were obscene, as admitted by
defendant, they could find him guilty regardless
of the purposes for which the films had been given.
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court
of San Bernardino County, California, reversed
and remanded, holding that since under some
circumstances material which is clearly obscene
by average standards can be put to lawful use.
the trial court's instruction incorrectly stated the
law, and that since there was some evidence that
the films were placed in transit to a medical technologist for the purpose of experimental use in a
hospital, the jury should have been instructed
that material "obscene" by average standards
can be lawfully "given" when in good faith it is
to be used exclusively within a professional group
pursuing legitimate professional purposes, where
it is not probable that the material will appeal
to the prurient interests of average members of
that group, and where the material is not likely to
fall into the hands of persons outside the group.
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Prejudicial Publicity-United States v. Smith,
200 F. Supp. 885 (D. Vt. 1961). Petitioner was
convicted of arson causing death, equivalent under
Vermont law to first degree murder. On petition
for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended
that Vermont had deprived him of due process
by failing to accord him a fair trial by a panel of
impartial jurors. The district court granted the
writ and discharged petitioner, allowing the
State, within a reasonable time, either to correct
the defects which rendered discharge necessary
or to appeal from the judgment, holding that where
members of the jury read newspaper publicity
highly prejudicial to petitioner, some of which
was directly attributable to disclosures to the
press by the State, the jury was not sufficiently
impartial to satisfy federal constitutional requirements even though each juror disclaimed any
prejudice or partiality, since the combination of
facts disclosed by the record and a realistic view of
human nature required the district court to disregard their declarations. (Subsequently, the
State elected to appeal from the judgment, and
the district court issued a certificate of probable
cause, denied Vermont's motion for stay of judgment, and admitted petitioner to S5,000 bail
pending the State's appeal.)

Prejudicial Publicity-Slate v. Rideau, 137
So. 2d 283 (La. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
murder. On appeal, he contended that the trial
court erred in refusing to allow challenges for
cause of three jurors on the ground that because
they had seen defendant confess on television (as
they had testified on voir dire), it was impossible
for them to be fair and impartial. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana affirmed, holding that so long
as the jurors testified that they could lay aside
any opinions as to guilt and base their decisions
solely upon the evidence regardless of anything
they may have heard, seen, or read of the case,
the fact that the jurors saw the television program
did not disqualify them, and the trial court correctly refused to allow the challenges for cause.

Prejudicial Publicity-People v. Gewvese, 180
N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of acting as a prize fight manager without a license,
and the Appellate Division affirmed. On appeal by
permission, defendant contended that the trial

court erred in denying his motion for mistrial on
the ground that adverse newspaper publicity
prejudiced jurors against him. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed, holding that in light
of the fact that two jurors were excused when
it appeared to the trial court that what they had
read might influence their verdict, six had not
read the articles, and six who had read them
declared that they nonetheless could render an
impartial verdict based solely on evidence received in court, denial of defendant's motion for
mistrial did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
The court noted that the problem of obtaining
truly impartial jurors is made more difficult "in a
society where crime and corruption are exploited
by the press." Chief judge Desmond dissented,
stating that jurors expqsed to such publicity cannot reasonably be expected to "wipe it off their
minds."

Promises of Leniency-Machibroda v. United
States, 82 Sup. Ct. 510 (1962). After petitioner
was convicted on two charges of bank robbery,
the district court denied, without hearing, his
motion to vacate and set aside the sentence [under
28 U.S.C. §2255 (1959)], and the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that the district court had violated FED. R. CR. P. 32(a) by failing to inquire
if petitioner wished to speak in his own behalf
before sentence was imposed, and that his guilty
pleas were not voluntary, having been induced by
promises of leniency made by an assistant United
States prosecutor. In an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Stewart, the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded for hearing on the petition,
holding that the district court's failure to inquire
at the time of sentencing whether petitioner
wished to make a statement in his own behalf did
not constitute error raisable on a §2255 motion,
for the reasons stated by the Court in Hill v.
United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 468 (1962) [see Sentencing, infra]; but since petitioner's factual assertions, while improbable, were not wholly incredible, and the issues raised thereby could not be
resolved without resort to material outside the
files and records of the trial, the district court
should have granted a hearing on petitioner's
motion in order to best serve the purposes of
§2255. Justices Warren, Black, Douglas, and
Brennan dissented in part, disagreeing with the
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Court's treatment of petitioner's first contention
for the reasons set out in their dissent in the Hill
case. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan joined in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, which
stated that the conclusion of the majority reprepresented an unwarranted restriction of the summary disposition provision of §2255 as well as a
failure to give due deference to the inferences
drawn by the district court and the Court of
Appeals.

Remarks by Prosecutor-State v. Gridley, 353
S.W.2d 705 (Mo. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of burglary and stealing. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in failing to
sustain his objection to an argument of the prosecutor that the jury should make an example of
defendant. The Supreme Court of Missouri
affirmed, holding that the prosecutor was entitled
to argue that the jury should convict and assess a
punishment against defendant in order to make an
example of him to others for the protection of the
community, since that is one of the reasons for
inflicting punishment upon those who violate the
law.
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trial, at which the jury failed to reach a verdict,
defendant was retried and convicted of burglary
and petty larceny. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court committed reversible error in
allowing the jury to hear an electronic recording of
testimony of one Carr, who had been a state's
witness at the first trial and was unavailable at the
second trial, on the grounds that defendant was
thereby deprived of his rights to be confronted by
Carr and to have the jury observe his demeanor.
The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed, holding
that inasmuch as the essential purpose of the state
and federal constitutional right to confrontation
is to secure the right of cross-examination, use of
the recorded testimony at the second trial did not
deprive defendant of his constitutional right,
since he had cross-examined Carr at the first trial,
and this cross-examination was included in the
recording heard by the convicting jury; and that
the use of electronically recorded testimony of the
unavailable witness preserved that portion of
demeanor which related to his voice, whereas no
demeanor evidence at all would have been preserved, had the former testimony been manually
reported. The court noted that the Alaska court
system has employed electronic recorders to the
exclusion of manual reporters since its inception
in 1960.

Right of Presence at Trial-State v. Vance,
124 S.E.2d 252 (W. Va. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of statutory rape. On writ of error,
defendant contended that his absence from the
trial for four or five minutes while instructions were
being discussed constituted a violation of a statute
[W. VA. CODE ch. 32, art. 3, §2 (1931)] requiring
that one indicted for a felony be personally present
during the trial, and that his conviction must
therefore be reversed. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia reversed, set aside the
verdict, and awarded a new trial, holding that
since the statute prescribed a mandatory requirement, judgment of conviction entered pursuant to
a trial at which the statute was even technically
violated could not stand; and that defendant's
short absence, since it occurred during his felony
trial, constituted a violation of the statute, even
though the absence was voluntary and resulted
in no prejudice to defendant's rights.

Right to Confrontation-Minturn v. State, 136
So. 2d 359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of rape. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to
require a state's witness to produce, for purposes of
cross-examination, a notebook to which the witness had referred during direct examination as a
means of refreshing his recollection. The District
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding
that failure to require that the notebook be made
available to the defense during cross-examination
constituted prejudicial error, since to hold otherwise would allow the circumvention of defendant's
right to full and fair cross-examination of witnesses,
which must be preserved in order to enforce the
constitutional guarantee that the accused be confronted by his accusers.

Right to Confrontation-McBride v. State, 368
P.2d 925 (Alaska 1962). Subsequent to his first

Right to Counsel-Chewning v. Cunningham,
82 Sup. Ct. 498 (1962). After petitioner was
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sentenced to 10 years imprisonment as a third
felony offender under Virginia's recidivist statute
[VA. CODE ANN. §53-296 (1950)], the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia refused a writ of
error to review the Law and Equity Court's
denial of petitioner's application for writ of habeas
corpus. On certiorari, petitioner contended that he
was tried and convicted without benefit of counsel,
although he had requested one. In an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Douglas, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that since a
trial on a charge of being an habitual criminal is so
serious, the issues presented under Virginia's
statute are so complex, and the potential prejudice
resulting from absence of counsel is so great, the
rule concerning appointment of counsel in other
types of criminal cases was equally applicable to
petitioner's case; and that denial of counsel in
the recidivist proceeding, where petitioner had
specifically requested counsel, entitled him to
release on habeas corpus. Mr. Justice Harlan
concurred only in the resuli, reasoning [in his
concurring opinion in Oyler v. Boles, 82 Sup. Ct.
501 (1962), see Habitual Criminal Acts, supra,
in which opinion he discussed both the Oyler and
the Chewning cases] that denial of counsel constituted a violation of procedural due process only
because of want of adequate notice prior to hearing
on the habitual criminal charge.
Right to Counsel-Solomon v. Slate, 138 So. 2d
79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of unlawful possession of moonshine
whiskey. On appeal, defendant contended that in
trying and convicting him within 24 hours of the
time he was informed of the charge against him,
the trial court deprived defendant of his constitutional right to be heard by counsel. The
District Court of Appeal set aside the judgment
and remanded, holding that while defendant was
not entitled to appointment of counsel, he did
have a right to be represented by a lawyer of his
own procurement, which necessarily carried with
it the additional right to have a fair and reasonable opportunity to procure counsel and prepare
for trial, and that the trial court's action in requiring defendant to go to trial in such a short
period of .time denied him such opportunity.
Scientific Evidence-Blood Grouping TestsBowden v. State, 137 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1962). De-

fendant was convicted of incest. On appeal,
defendant contended that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to order blood
grouping tests which defendant requested in order
to impeach the veracity of his daughter, the prosecutrix, by conclusively disproving his paternity
of her child. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that although there was no specific statute
on the subject, Florida trial courts have inherent
authority to order blood gruuping tests, in their
sound discretion., in criminal cases; that if paternity were the determinative factual issue in a
criminal case, a trial court's refusal to order such
tests at a defendant's request would amount to an
abuse of discretion and a practical denial of due
process; but since in the instant case paternity was
not a determinative issue, and, aside from any
proof that defendant was the father of his daughter's child, there was sufficient evidence to support
the incest verdict, the trial court's refusal to order
the tests was not reversible error.

Search and Seizure--DiBlla v. United Stales,
United States v. Koenig, 82 Sup. Ct. 654 (1962).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that the district court's denial of defendant
DiBella's pre-indictment motion to suppress
was appealable, while the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that the Government could not
appeal from the district court's order granting
defendant Koenig's pre-indictment motion to
suppress. Not having previously passed upon the
question, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the two cases to resolve the
conflict among the circuits as to whether a ruling
on a pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence
constitutes an appealable "final decision" within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1291 (1959). In an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the
Court affirmed the judgment in the Koenig case
and vacated and remanded the DiBella case with
instructions to dismiss the appeal, holding that a
ruling on a pre-indictment motion to suppress is
not an appealable "final decision," because appeal
from such a motion, which is not fairly severable
from the context of the impending trial, would
seriously disrupt the conduct of the proceedings,
and further because the legality of a search often
cannot be determined until the evidence at the
trial has brought all circumstances to light.
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Search and Seizure-Hall v. Warden, 201 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1962). Petitioner was sentenced
to death on a state conviction of first degree murder, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland (on
July 8, 1960) affirmed; subsequently, the Circuit
Court denied his application for post-conviction
relief, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. At the hearing on his
petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that his constitutional rights were violated because illegally seized material was used
both to procure damaging admissions from him
and as evidence at his trial, and that Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CRI. L.,
C. & P.S. 292 (1961), required that relief be
granted. The District Court denied relief, holding
that Mapp v. Ohio, which compels the states to
follow the exclusionary rule, was not intended to
require that one convicted in a state court must
be granted relief on the ground that illegally
seized evidence was used against him, where the
point was not raised at the trial and the state
court judgment had become final before the United
States Supreme Court's decision in the Mapp
case. In reaching its conclusion that Mapp was
not meant to be retroactively applied, the District
Court relied on Mr. Justice Clark's frequent use,
in the Mapp opinion, of such words as "then,"
"today," and "no longer," and on the reasons for
the United States Supreme Court's previous
refusal to impose the exclusionary rule on the
states.

Search and Seizure-People v. Handy, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 409 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of possessing marijuana. On appeal,
defendant contended that since officers had reasonable cause [based on information from a reliable
informer) to arrest defendant on February 22,
and, at that time, to conduct a reasonable search
pursuant thereto, their search of his premises
without a warrant on February 28 was rendered
unlawful by the unreasonable lapse of time; and
consequently defendant's conviction, supported
by narcotics seized in the search, must be reversed.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding
that since police officers, experienced in narcotics
matters, believed reasonably and in good faith
that defendant would still be in possession of
narcotics on the 28th, and since the test of lawful-
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ness of a search is whether the search was reasonable rather than whether it was reasonable to
procure a search warrant, the search on the 28th
was lawful in spite of the fact that it could lawfully have been conducted on the 22d, where the
delay was due to the pressure of other police
responsibilities.

Search and Seizure-State v. Trumbull, 176
A.2d 887 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1961). Defendant was
charged with counterfeiting labels. Moving for the
suppression and return of evidence, defendant
contended that the material had been seized as the
result of an unconstitutional search. The Circuit
Court of Connecticut granted the motion to
suppress, but refused to return the evidence.
It held that defendant's acquiescence "n the
demands of the searching officers, who told him
that they had a right to see the articles, did not
amount to consent, and hence the evidence seized
must be suppressed, since defendant did not waive
his constitutional rights against a warrantless
search; but lacking an appropriate procedure, the
articles could not be returned. The court construed and applied Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
abstracted at 52 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961),
and noted that Mapp changed Connecticut search
and seizure law.

Search and Seizure -Leveson v. State, 138 So. 2d
361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was
convicted of bookmaking, possession of lottery
tickets, and aiding in setting up, promoting, or
conducting a lottery. On appeal, defendant con-.
tended that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress, because the court erroneously
found that defendant lacked standing to contest
the validity of the search and seizure. The District
Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding
that although Florida courts were under no compulsion to follow federal decisions as to standing to
move for the suppression of illegally seized evidence, federal decisions relating to search and
seizure are generally accepted as authority for
similar rulings by Florida courts, inasmuch as the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 22 of the Declaration of
Rights of the Constitution of Florida are the same
in meaning and almost identical in wording; that
the applicable federal decision [Jones j. United
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States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)] holds that one legitimately on the premises searched is entitled to
object to the validity of the search; and that
consequently the trial court should have adjudicated the merits of defendant's motion to suppress, since although the lease to the apartment
which was searched was taken in the name of his
"girl friend," defendant, who paid the rent for and
possessed a key to the premises, was legitimately
on the premises and thus had standing to make
the motion.

Search and Seizure-Belton v. State, 178 A.2d
409 (Md. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
possession and control of a narcotic drug and
narcotic paraphernalia on the basis of evidence
obtained as a result of an admittedly unlawful
search and seizure. On appeal, defendant contended that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted
at 52 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961), decided
after his conviction, required Maryland to apply
the exclusionary rule to his case, and that as an
invitee on the searched premises, he had standing
to object to the admissibility of the evidence in
question. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed and remanded, holding that although
defendant was convicted before the Mapp decision, judgment on the verdict was not entered
until after Mapp was decided, and therefore the
exclusionary rule must be applied in the instant
case; that since the exclusionary rule is now imposed upon the states, in applying that rule the
states must necessarily use the federal standard
regarding standing to object; and that consequently defendant had standing to object, since
the federal standard, as stated in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), is that the right to
object to the admission of illegally seized evidence
is available to anyone legitimately on the searched
premises. The Court of Appeals noted that this
federal standard is more liberal than that applied
in Maryland prior to the Mapp decision.

Search and Seizure-State v. Masi, 177 A.2d
773 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1962). Defendant made a
pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. He contended that the material in question, obtained as a
direct result of an unreasonable search without a
warrant, was inadmissible by virtue of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CRiM. L.,

C. & P.S. 292 (1961), even though Mapp had not
yet been decided at the time of the search. The
Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
granted the motion, holding that although a
statutory change in settled law operates only
prospectively, a change established by judicial
decision is retrospective; and consequently the
Mapp rule, which requires states to adhere to the
exclusionary rule, must be applied to defendant's
case, and likewise to every case in which the
search and seizure issue was properly raised, regardless of the law existing at the time of the
search and seizure.

Search and Seizure-State v. Long, 177 A.2d
609 (N.J. Essex County Court 1962). Defendant
was convicted of bookmaking and of keeping a
gambling resort, at a trial in which illegally seized
evidence was admitted. After the Appellate
Division affirmed, defendant moved the County
Court for a new trial on the ground that Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. CIUm. L.,
C. & P.S. 292 (1961), decided after his conviction
and requiring the states to apply the exclusionary
rule, constituted newly discovered evidence, and
that it should be given retroactive effect. The
County Court denied defendant's motion, holding
that a subsequent legal decision does not constitute newly discovered evidence so as to justify
the granting of a new trial; and that language in
the Mapp case regarding the necessity of respecting state procedural requirements (367 U.S. at
659 n.9) supported denial of defendant's motion
solely on the ground that he failed to make timely
objection to admission of the illegally seized
evidence. Although the question of the applicability of Mapp thus was not necessary to decision
of the instant case, the court noted that in light
of the need for stability in the administration of
law, Mapp should not be given retroactive effect.

Search and Seizure-People v. Loria, 179 N.E.2d
478 (N.Y. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
narcotic laws violations in January, 1961, and on
June 13, 1961, his conviction was affirmed by the
Appellate Division. On appeal, defendant contended that since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
abstracted at 52 J. Cimr. L., C & P.S. 292 (1961)
(decided on June 19, 1961), requires that illegally
seized evidence be held inadmissible in a state
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court, his conviction, based on such evidence, must
be reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded for determination of the issue of probable cause, holding, in accord with the general rule
of deciding cases on appeal under the law as it
exists at the time of such decision, that the Mapp
rule must be applied in deciding appeals from preMapp convictions, even where, as in the instant
case, an intermediate appellate court had affirmed
before Mapp was decided; and that since the record
did not establish whether police officers had probable cause to search the premises without a warrant (because the then existing law did not require
such proof), the case would be remanded to enable
the state to prove, if it could, the legality of the
search.

Sentencing-Defendant's Right to be HeardHill v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 468 (1962).
Petitioner was convicted of transporting a kidnapped person and a stolen automobile in interstate commerce. On certiorari after the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of his motion to vacate sentence
[under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (1959)], petitioner contended that he had been denied the right conferred
by FED. R. C x. P. 32(a) to have the opportunity
to make a statement in his own behalf before being
sentenced, and that this alone constituted grounds
for successful collateral attack of the judgment
and sentence on a §2255 motion. Speaking through
Mr. Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed, holding that in light of the
legislative history of §2255, which shows that it
was intended to grant the same rights as those
available on habeas corpus, mere failure of the
district court explicitly to afford petitioner an
opportunity to make a statement at the time of
sentencing [i.e., mere failure to comply with the
formal requirements of Rule 32(a)] did not furnish
grounds for successful §2255 attack, since such
failure constituted neither jurisdictional nor
constitutional error nor a fundamentally unfair
defect and was not of itself an error of the character
or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas
corpus'; and that even if the §2255 motion were
treated as a motion to correct an illegal sentence
under FED. R. CRW. P. 35, petitioner was entitled
to no relief, since the narrow function of Rule 35
is to permit correction of an illegal sentence [i.e.,
one imposed in excess of the limits prescribed, or
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in violation of the prohibition against double
jeopardy], not to re-examine errors occurring prior
to imposition of sentence. In a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Warren, Douglas, and Brennan
joined, Mr. Justice Black reasoned that petitioner
should have been granted relief under Rule 35,
since a sentence imposed in a prohibited manner,
as was petitioner's, is just as "illegal" within the
meaning of that rule as is one meted out in a
clearly unauthorized amount or form.

Sentencing-Defendant's Right to be HeardMachibroda v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 510
(1962). See Promises of Leniency, supra.

Sex Offenses-In re Lane, 18 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1962). Petitioner was convicted on two counts of
violating §41.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal
Code, which deemed criminal all sexual intercourse between persons not married to each other,
and the Appellate Department affirmed. On petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended
that the state had preempted the field of regulating
the criminal aspects of sexual activity, and hence
that the ordinance was void. The Supreme Court
of California discharged petitioner, holding that
when the state legislature expressly provided
criminal penalties for a large number of sexual
activities without making fornication a crime, it
determined by implication that such conduct
should not be criminal in California; and consequently the municipal ordinance, which attempted
to make such conduct criminal, was void for being
in conflict with state law.

Sunday Closing Laws-State v. Katz Drug Co.,
352 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1961); State v. Hill, 369
P.2d 365 (Kan. 1962). The Supreme Courts of two
states recently have ruled on the constitutionality
of their almost identical Sunday closing laws and
have reached opposite results. Both statutes
punished as a misdemeanor the sale or exposure
for sale of any merchandise on Sunday, but excepted from punishment "the sale of any drugs or
medicines, provisions, or other articles of immediate necessity." [Mo. Rxv. STAT. §§563.720-30
(1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§21-955 & 56
(Supp. 1959)] Reversing the conviction in State
r. Katz Drug Co. on other grounds, the Supreme

